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Summary box
 ► Low- income and middle- income countries are align-
ing their National Action Plans on antimicrobial resis-
tance with WHO’s 2015 Global Action Plan.
 ► Regulation is a key tool for operationalising national 
standards aimed at optimising the use of antimicro-
bial medicines.
 ► On its own, the traditional command- and- control ap-
proach to regulation is poorly suited to this challenge.
 ► ‘Smart regulation’ can be used to supplement, fine- 
tune and improve on more traditional regulatory 
approaches.
InTroduCTIon
Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) contrib-
utes to over 700 000 annual deaths globally. 
According to the O’Neill report, an esti-
mated 10 million lives a year and a cumula-
tive US$100 trillion of economic output will 
be at risk by 2050 if we do not put in place 
proactive solutions now. Tackling AMR is a 
multifaceted task that requires a One Health 
approach encompassing human, animal 
and environmental health as suggested in 
the WHO’s 2015 Global Action Plan (GAP) 
on AMR. Countries around the world have 
aligned their National Action Plans (NAPs) 
on AMR with this international guidance.
One of the important links for various activ-
ities for AMR containment is the appropriate 
use of antibiotics to reduce selection pressure 
on microbes. In low- income and middle- 
income countries (LMICs), however, antibi-
otic consumption rates have been converging 
towards (and in some countries surpassing) 
levels typically observed in high- income 
countries.1 Further, a higher burden of infec-
tious diseases and restricted access to new 
antibiotics suggest a higher burden of AMR 
in LMICs than in high- income countries.2 
Finally, there is rampant misuse or overuse of 
antibiotics in humans3 4 and food animals as 
well as their exposure in the environment.5 6 
While the nature of pathways for the emer-
gence and transmission of AMR and the 
functionality of the regulatory system across 
various sectors might differ among LMICs, 
they all face this core public health challenge. 
There is therefore a pressing need for effec-
tive design and implementation of activities 
for NAP- AMR in LMICs. This paper contrib-
utes to the literature on AMR regulation by 
discussing the approach known as ‘smart 
regulation’ and outlining how it may be used 
to supplement, fine- tune and improve upon 
more traditional regulatory approaches for 
optimum use of antibiotics in One Health 
sectors.
AMr And THe TrAdITIonAl ApproACH To 
regulATIon
WHO’s GAP identified regulation as a key 
tool for ensuring the operationalisation of 
national standards to optimise the use of anti-
microbial medicines in human and animal 
health. More recently, the United Nations 
Inter- Agency Coordination Group on AMR 
also recommended the development, mainte-
nance, strengthening and implementation of 
AMR regulation for human, animal and envi-
ronmental health.
Traditionally, the term ‘regulation’ refers to 
the top- down command- and- control model 
of regulation, which imposes standards and 
sanctions in case of non- compliance with 
the standards.7 This traditional model is a 
key feature of the regulatory landscape for 
some of the plausible pathways of AMR in a 
number of LMICs. For instance, laws prohibit 
over- the- counter (OTC) sales of antibiotics 
by pharmacists without a prescription from 
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Box 1 Core regulatory design principles
1. Incorporate a broad range of complementary instruments and 
actors.
2. Prefer least interventionist (prescriptive or coercive) but viable 
instruments.
3. Create a ‘regulatory enforcement pyramid’ that comprises three 
faces representing first parties (government), second parties (busi-
ness) and third parties (commercial eg, financial markets and insur-
ers and non- commercial, eg, non- governmental organisations and 
other groups) and set out progressively serious penalties for non- 
compliance across several instruments and different faces.
4. Empower second and third parties to act as surrogate regulators.
5. Optimise the opportunity for win- win outcomes.
drug inspectors to monitor compliance and punish viola-
tion with a fine or imprisonment or both.8 For a variety of 
reasons, however, the enforcement of such laws in LMICs 
may be patchy or non- existent.9 For other pathways, such 
as the disposal of antibiotic residues in effluent from 
antibiotic manufacturing, laws are in a nascent stage or 
non- existent.
When viewed from a traditional regulatory perspec-
tive, legislators can solve the problem of gaps in the law 
by formulating appropriate regulatory standards. Once 
appropriate laws are on the statute books, non- compliance 
can be addressed through measures including greater 
investment in regulatory infrastructure, increasing the 
numbers of trained regulators and resolving instances 
of confusion, overlap or fragmentation of responsibili-
ties among the array of regulatory bodies charged with 
enforcing the laws. Although these ways of bolstering 
the traditional regulatory approach are indeed valuable 
and necessary, they may not be sufficient to address the 
complex challenges at hand.
One problem with the traditional regulatory perspec-
tive is that it envisages a top- down relationship between 
the regulator and the regulated entity. It often does not 
allow space for meaningful engagement between the two, 
or with the range of other actors who directly or indi-
rectly influence and/or are affected by regulation. This 
is problematic, particularly in LMICs, as regulations may 
be drafted without fully appreciating situated interests 
and how socioeconomic and structural factors underpin 
behaviour. The regulatory standards that emerge may 
therefore fail to secure widespread support. Private stake-
holders may resist or actively contest regulatory policies 
if these are perceived as threatening their interests.10 
Recent WHO11 and Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO)12 guidance highlights the importance of multisec-
toral coordination and engaging diverse stakeholders as 
an aspect of successful implementation of AMR NAPs. 
There is scope for further discussion, however, around 
optimum methodologies for achieving these goals. 
Furthermore, although existing recommendations for 
regulatory reform in some LMICs already envisage multis-
takeholder engagement in some sectors, this typically will 
not be advocated at an upstream stage when stakeholders 
might have meaningful input into the regulatory design 
process. ‘Smart regulation’ is worthy of consideration in 
relation to these and other points.
‘SMArT regulATIon’ of AMr
Gunningham et al coined the term ‘smart regulation’ 
‘to overcome the inefficiencies of traditional regulation 
on the one hand, and the pitfalls of deregulation on the 
other’.13 According to them, smart regulation describes 
a form of ‘regulatory pluralism’ that embraces much 
more ‘flexible, imaginative and innovative forms of social 
control’ than conventional regulation. The authors 
asserted that not only could smart regulation be effec-
tive in delivering policy objectives; it can also increase 
efficiency by doing so at least cost to the government, 
business and the community. Furthermore, it was devel-
oped as a useful way to approach regulating complex 
areas that involve multiple stakeholders with converging 
and diverging interests.
Designing smart regulation involves two stages. First, 
the policymakers should identify the desired policy 
goal(s) and the trade- offs necessary to achieve it, the 
unique characteristics of the problem, the range of 
potential actors and instruments and opportunities for 
consultation and public participation. Then, they should 
apply five enabling core regulatory design principles 
sequentially to arrive at solutions (box 1).
Gunningham et al originally developed smart regula-
tion in the context of environmental regulation, but they 
recognised that the implications of their research could 
extend to other domains. Subsequently, scholars have 
considered the application of smart regulation to other 
fields, including e- waste,14 shipping15 and health regu-
lation.16 Policymakers have already applied the concept 
across different sectors, including the environment, agri-
culture, food safety and health in Canada17 and the Euro-
pean Union.18 Although most of these developments 
have taken place in western countries, we suggest that 
smart regulation offers a useful framework to address the 
challenge of AMR in LMICs.
To illustrate, we discuss how the above five core regula-
tory design principles of the smart regulation approach 
might be applied in practice, using OTC sales of antibiotics 
without a valid prescription (which is rampant in LMICs) 
as an example. For the first principle, a broad range of 
instruments and actors could be involved in the design 
and implementation of regulation. Actors could include 
government/regulators, pharmacists, associations of 
pharmacists, consumers, representatives of consumers, 
non- governmental organisations (NGOs), area resident 
welfare associations, community/religious leaders, local 
government bodies, pharmaceutical companies and their 
sales representatives, importers, wholesalers and distrib-
utors of antibiotics. In terms of instruments, traditional 
regulation, voluntary codes of conduct, awareness/infor-
mation campaigns and the use of technology could all 
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interventionist but viable instrument could take the form 
of education and awareness instead of immediate impo-
sition of a penalty. For the third principle, the regulatory 
enforcement pyramid could comprise the government/
regulator (first face), pharmacists and associations of 
pharmacists (second face) and consumers, representa-
tives of consumers, NGOs, area resident welfare associ-
ations, community/religious leaders, local government 
bodies, pharmaceutical companies and their sales repre-
sentatives, importers and wholesalers and distributors of 
antibiotics (third face). Progressively serious penalties 
for non- compliance could be set out across several instru-
ments and different faces. This could take the form of: 
education and awareness, then a warning, followed by 
a second warning and a nominal fine, then temporary 
closure of pharmacy and a higher fine, then ultimately 
imprisonment. For the fourth principle, surrogate regu-
lators could include the actors represented in the second 
and third faces, harnessing their ability to implement 
forms of regulation including self- regulation. Fifth, 
all the above- mentioned actors could work together to 
explore and optimise opportunities for win- win opportu-
nities. In this case, this could mean attempting to satisfy 
public health interests (ie, that antibiotics are not over-
used or misused) alongside ensuring that the economic 
interests of pharmacists as business owners and members 
of the community are also supported.
ConCluSIon
Some existing regulatory arrangements and policy 
proposals11 12 for implementing NAPs on AMR in LMICs 
already advocate moving beyond a traditional regula-
tory approach by emphasising the importance of multi-
sectoral coordination and stakeholder engagement. To 
these suggestions, smart regulation adds further useful 
elements, including a stronger emphasis on involving 
stakeholders in the design of regulatory standards (ie, 
not just in the implementation of standards they have 
been unable to shape) across all relevant policy areas, the 
deployment of a broader range of regulatory tools and 
the goal of developing win- win regulatory options when-
ever possible.
Smart regulation utilises the existing institutional, 
legal and governance framework, including the tradi-
tional command- and- control approach, but also expands 
options for regulators. It could encourage behaviour 
change, incentivise regulatory compliance and ensure 
the most efficient and effective application of the 
resources of different actors as well as greater acceptance 
and smoother implementation of regulatory instru-
ments. By taking into account the consequences of regu-
lation on different actors from the outset, it might also 
be possible to avoid or mitigate problems arising from 
the unintended consequences of AMR regulation. This 
would also represent an advance from the perspective of 
equity, which is critical in LMICs.
Of course, the successful operationalisation of smart 
regulation of AMR would be contingent, among other 
factors, on sequential application of all of the core 
regulatory design principles, including ensuring the 
complementarity of actors and instruments and viability 
of instruments, as well as effective monitoring mecha-
nisms to avoid unintended consequences, in addition 
to avoiding regulatory capture. With awareness of these 
issues, LMICs can harness the advantages offered by 
smart regulation to develop more efficient, workable and 
effective regulatory frameworks for tackling AMR.
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